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Abstract 
The treaty of Lisbon introduced several significant institutional changes to the EU. 
The main research question of this thesis is therefore the following: How has the 
institutional changes in the treaty of Lisbon affected how the EU debates norms and 
what norms the EU refers to? 
In order to approach the research problem this thesis uses a comparative case 
study design which looks at how the EU debate and refer to norms before and after 
the adoption of the treaty of Lisbon. The method used is a form of qualitative 
content analysis which analyses the transcripts of speeches made by the EU in the 
UN. 
The results of this thesis are that we cannot observe any clear changes in how 
norms are referred to and discussed in the UN. This suggests that changes in formal 
institutions do not affect how actors debate and refer to norms. We should also not 
expect to see any changes in the immediate time period.  
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List of abbreviations  
 
CBTB  The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy 
CTBTO  The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
ECSC The European Coal and Steel Community 
EDA The European Defence Agency 
EEAS The European External Action Service 
EP  The European Parliament 
EURATOM The European Atomic Energy Community 
HCOC The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile 
Proliferation  
HI Historical institutionalism 
HR  The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IR International Relations 
NPT The Treaty of Non-Proliferation 
RCI Rational choice institutionalism  
START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly. In this thesis used to refer 
to the time of each year when the UN member states meet in 
New York to discuss current issues on the international 
agenda.  
  3 
1 Introduction 
“To understand power in international relations, we must place it side by side with other 
quintessentially social concepts such as prestige, authority, and legitimacy” 
Andrew Hurell, On global order (2007:39). 
 
From the ashes of World War II the EU has arisen to become one of the most 
influential organizations in the world.  Often seen as the world’s ‘soft power’ the 
EU has frequently underlined the importance of diplomatic solutions and trade 
rather than military interventions (see Utrikespolitiska institutet, 2009:52). In 
contrast to many other actors in the world arena the EU is constantly changing and 
one of the more significant changes was introduced in the treaty of Lisbon.  
The treaty is one of the most important one in the history of the EU because it 
amended the foundational treaties of the EU and introduced new institutional 
configurations (see Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:20). For instance the EU now has a 
position similar to a country’s foreign minister which is tasked with representing 
the EU in external matters. The question is what effects these institutional changes 
has had on the EU, especially in matters concerning ‘soft power’.  
As illustrated in the quotation by Andrew Hurell social concepts are vital to 
include in our analysis if we are to understand power in international relations. 
Power is more than geopolitical considerations. Powerful ideas like human rights, 
sovereignty and human dignity affect how and why states act. A world without 
norms, values and principles is an unrealistic world were humans behave more like 
robots than humans.  
One could at the same time question ‘soft powers’ influence in world politics 
since norms and rights are often referred to but arguably not always acted upon. For 
instance, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 might have been motivated more by 
geopolitical considerations rather than norms and values. Surely, some might argue, 
it is only natural resources, military might and rational interests that determine how 
states act? 
This is a somewhat problematic view on the world since norms and rationality 
is closely related (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:888-889). While some IR-
scholars try to ignore and downplay the importance of norms and values they often 
implicitly have a normative dimension to their analysis (Erskine, 2010:47). One 
good illustration of the problems with downplaying the importance of norms is 
when realist scholars argue that Thucydides classical work History of the 
Peloponnesian War is one of the earliest examples of a realist viewpoint. This is a 
problematic interpretation since Thucydides focuses a lot of attention on moral 
norms and how war disrupts these important norms (Monoson & Loriaux, 2006:38-
41). It is also interesting to note that Thucydides actually criticizes some assumption 
that realist tend to make (Ibid, 2006:50). 
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Thus, the question is how the institutional changes prescribed in the treaty of 
Lisbon has affected how the EU debate and refer to norms. As influential as the EU 
is, any changes in the norms the EU support will most likely affect the rest of the 
world. Has the EU become more aggressive in regards to defending norms in world 
politics or is it too soon to note any effects? In this thesis I aim to bring light to this 
issue and try to conclude if institutional change can have an impact on how actors 
refer to and debate norms. 
1.1 Statement of purpose and research question  
The main aim of this thesis is to study how institutional change affect how actors 
debate and refer to norms. This is a research area which needs to be studied because 
current institutional theories often ignore the possible effects an institutional change 
might cause. Many theories describe the genesis of institutions but few focus on 
what possible effects institutional change can cause. By studying institutional 
change and norms we achieve an understanding of what effects an institutional 
change can have.  
It is also important to study this area since norms play an important role in 
international relations. Norms can be understood in many ways (which is discussed 
in the theoretical framework) but one of the most common views on norms is that 
norms prescribe the appropriate behaviour. If institutional change has any influence 
on norms the ‘rules of the game’ might be subject to change and in turn have an 
effect on how actors behave.  
Norms are also closely related to morals in that it constitutes what matters in 
international relations. Norms highlight what is important for actors which in turn 
affect how they act since a deviation of a norm will lead to debate and criticism 
from those who support the norm (see Erskine, 2010:46-48 and Raymond, 
1973:213-214). If the institutional change has affected how the EU refers to and 
debate norms then this might have an impact on what topics will become the centre 
of attention in international relations. 
In order to provide possible conclusions to the aim of this thesis I will use a 
research question to narrow down my research area. The question that will be used 
in this thesis is the following: 
 
 How has the institutional changes in the treaty of Lisbon affected how the EU 
debates norms and what norms the EU refers to?  
 
The research question used in this thesis uses the concept of norms and 
institutional change. These concepts will be discussed and defined in the theoretical 
framework. 
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2 The EU and the treaty of Lisbon 
Before we can start analysing the effects of the treaty of Lisbon we need to have an 
understanding of how the EU has evolved and what the treaty of Lisbon changed. 
Due to the many changes prescribed in the treaty of Lisbon I will mainly focus on 
the changes made in the Commission, the European Parliament (henceforth 
abbreviated to the EP) and the European Council since these are among the central 
institutions regarding the general function of the EU. 
The history of the EU begins in the aftermath of the Second World War where 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was formally established in 1951 
through the treaty of Paris (Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:13-14). The ECSC continued 
to evolve with focus on creating an internal European market and increasing the 
number of member states in the organization (see Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:15-
18). In 1957 the treaty of Rome was adopted and the European Economic 
Communities (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) 
was officially established (Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:14). The ECSC, EEC and 
EAEC (often called the European Communities) continued to coexist until 1967 
when the Merger treaty was adopted. This treaty merged the EEC, EURATOM and 
ECSC, and created a single Commission and Council for the European 
Communities (Europa, 2014a). 
In 1992 the Maastricht treaty was adopted which revised the foundational 
treaties and created a new organizational structure (Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:18). 
This new structure meant that the EEC was transformed from an economic union 
to a political union and the EEC changed its name to the European Union 
(Utrikespolitiska institutet, 2009:7 and Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:18). The 
Maastricht treaty also introduced the so called three pillars which is the European 
Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters (Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:18). The Maastricht 
treaty also gave more power to the EP and created a co-decision procedure between 
the EP and the European Council (Summaries of EU legislation, 2014a and Europa, 
2014a). However, the Maastricht treaty was criticized for not being enough change, 
which lead to changes through the Amsterdam treaty and the Nice treaty (Bernitz 
& Kjellgren, 2012:19 & Utrikespolitiska institutet, 2009:10).  
Despite the revisions the decision process was still criticized which lead to a 
new revision; the treaty of Lisbon (Bernitz & Kjellgren, 2012:19-20). The treaty 
was officially adopted in 2009 by all the EU member states. This entails several 
important changes to how the EU functions and is organized. One of the important 
changes in the institutional design of the EU was the creation of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). Before, 
the responsibility held by the HR was divided between the High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Commissioner for External 
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Relations. The HR is also the vice-president of the European Commission and the 
administrator of the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Summaries of EU 
legislation, 2014a). 
The main task of the HR is to conduct the EU’s common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP). This means that the HR has the right to propose defence and security 
missions. Any issues related to the CFSP is represented by the HR on behalf of the 
EU. The HR also represents the EU at third party talks and expresses the EU’s 
position in international forums. The HR also presides over the Foreign Affairs 
Council of Ministers (European Union External Services, 2014a), which before the 
treaty of Lisbon was chaired by representatives of the Council of Ministers. 
However, it is important to note that the HR is not the only one that represent the 
EU in external matters. The president of European Council also represents the EU 
in external matters, but on a separate level and not with the same power as the HR. 
The treaty of Lisbon does not specify how the work is divided between the HR and 
the European Council. Instead, the HR and the Council decide how the work is 
divided amongst themselves through practical experience (Summaries of EU 
legislation, 2014b).  
Another important institutional change to the HR position was the creation of 
the European External Acton Service (EEAS).  The HR is in charge of the EEAS 
which in turn aids the HR in the everyday work to ensure that the EU’s external 
actions are consistent and coordinated. The EEAS also assist the president of the 
European Council and the members of the commission in matters concerning 
external relations and ensures close cooperation between the member states 
(European Union External Services, 2014a). The EEAS was established on the 26 
July 2010 through a decision in the Council of Ministers (2010/427/EU) which was 
based on a proposal from the HR and endorsed by the EP. The EEAS was officially 
launched in January 2011 (European Union External Services, 2014b).  
The Council of Ministers has with the treaty of Lisbon expanded the use of 
qualified majority voting (QMV) (Summaries of EU legislation, 2014d), but QMV 
is still exempted in taxation or foreign policy decisions (Europa, 2014b). The 
Council of Ministers also had its function clarified in that two configurations (the 
general affairs council and the foreign affairs council) where the ministers meet. 
The general affairs council are responsible for ensuring consistency in the council’s 
different configurations and preparing European Council meetings while the 
foreign affairs council is responsible for developing the foreign policies of the EU 
(Summaries of EU legislation, 2014d).  
While the European Council did not achieve any legislative powers through the 
treaty of Lisbon the treaty did officially include the European Council (before the 
council was not an official EU institution) in the EU and created a new president 
position in the council (Summaries of EU legislation, 2014e). The president is 
elected for two and a half years (Utrikespolitiska institutet 2009:14). 
The function of the European Council is that it designates the direction of EU 
politics. This means that the European Council defines the schedule and objectives 
for the European Commission, Council of the EU and the EP. The president of the 
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council is tasked with driving forward the work of the European Council so that the 
work is consistent over time, and to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the 
European Council. The European Council also proposes a candidate for the HR 
position (Summaries of EU legislation, 2014e). 
The Commission also saw some changed with the treaty. As discussed earlier 
one change was the creation of the HR position within the Commission. The treaty 
of Lisbon also clarified the number of commissioners and changed so that the 
European Council now has to take into account the results of the election results of 
the EP (Summaries of EU legislation, 2014f). 
The EP saw the co-decision procedure increased to new political fields and 
strengthened its power over the annual EU budget. The EP kept its task in electing 
the president of the Commission and also has to give its consent to the commission 
as a whole before the Commission can begin its work. The number of seats in the 
parliament increased as well (Summaries of EU legislation, 2014g). 
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3 Theoretical framework 
In this part I will discuss the theoretical framework that will be used in this thesis. 
The two main concepts that will be used are institutions and norms. First I will have 
a general discussion about the concept of institutions. After that I will discuss 
different institutional theories and conclude what we can expect from an 
institutional change. After that I will discuss the concept of norms, decide on a 
definition and chose a typology of norms. When that is done I will address some of 
the challenges with the theoretical framework.  
3.1 Institutions 
In order to be able to use the concept of institutions we first need to define what an 
institution is. When I have defined my understanding of what an institution is I will 
discuss what different theories tell us about the possible effects of an institutional 
change.   
3.1.1 What are institutions?   
One of the most commonly used concepts in social science is institutions. The 
concept is often used when explaining micro-, meso- and macro-level processes and 
phenomena. The concept is widely used but a shared universal definition is hard to 
find. 
There are two main challenges with using the concept of institutions by itself 
and in relation to norms. First of all social scientists tend to use either the concept 
of institutions or the concept of norms when explaining identical (or very similar) 
processes which causes some confusion (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891 and 
Kay, 2003:407). While one person might use institutions when explaining what 
causes institutions to change another one might use norms instead. In this thesis the 
distinction between institutions and norms is to be understood as norms being single 
standards of appropriate behaviour and institutions being set of behavioural rules 
that are organized together and interrelate (see Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891). 
The second problem is that the concept of institution differ depending on what 
institutional theory we use (March & Olsen, 2006:4). Those who use a rational 
choice approach will focus on other aspects of institutions than those who use a 
constructivist approach (see part 3.1.2 for a more detailed discussion of this). This 
presents us with a challenge when we want to use different approaches to 
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understand the same case. We thus need to keep this in mind when using different 
theories to explain the same case.  
While there exists differences among the different theories concerning the 
concept of institutions everyone define institutions as some form of social order that 
restrict behaviour (see Hague & Harrop, 2007:86, Hurrell, 2007:59, March & 
Olsen, 2006:3, Olsen, 2009:5-6 & Rodrik, 2007:154). Institutions restrict how 
actors can behave by assigning the proper behaviour by defining and referring to 
rights and obligations. Therefore, members of an institution is expected to follow 
the proper behaviour, obey and guard the standards and principles of the institution 
(March & Olsen, 2006:7). While many approaches share the understanding that 
institutions restrict actors behaviour there are disagreements on why institutions 
change and what effects these changes have (see Olsen, 2009:3). This will be 
discussed in part 3.1.2.  
It is also important to distinct between formal and informal institutions. Douglas 
North was one of the first to highlight the difference between formal and informal 
institutions and he defined formal institutions as “political (and judicial) rules, 
economic rules, and contracts” (North quoted in Bleich, 2006:221) and informal 
institutions as “codes of conduct, norms of behaviour and conventions” (North 
quoted in Bleich, 2006:221). This distinction presents us with an important issue 
that needs to be addressed which is how we study institutions.  
Formal institutions are often considered easier to analyse than informal 
institutions (Bleich, 2006:221-222). For instance, a change in the electoral rules in 
a country is easier to study since this change can be traced in the country’s law, the 
working documents leading up to the decision and the political debate within the 
country’s parliament. In contrast, changes in rules of conduct, norms and 
conventions has to be observed and interpret, which makes it harder to study. 
Norms, rules of conduct and conventions are often not written down but have to be 
interpret by the observer.  
In regards to formal and informal institutions this thesis will only focus on 
formal institutions. The aim of this thesis is to explore if the changes in the treaty 
of Lisbon has had any effect on how norms are debated by the EU. Thus, the focus 
is on the formal institutions and not on the informal institutions. We therefore need 
to keep in mind that the informal institutions might have an effect but I will not be 
able to say anything about that with this in this thesis. 
In light of the previous discussion on the general idea of what institutions are I 
have decided to use James G. March and Johan P. Olsen’s definition used in the 
book The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. March and Olsen define 
institutions as:  
 
“is a relatively enduring collection of rules and organized practices, embedded in 
structures of meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of 
individuals and relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of 
individuals and changing external circumstances” (March & Olsen, 2006:3) 
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This definition establishes that institutions are a collection of rules and 
organized practices embedded in structures of meaning. This is more of a 
constructivist view on the world in that actors are affected by structures of meaning. 
Thus, individuals are affected by their background (education, culture and so on), 
their language and their understanding of the world (see Schuetz, 1953:2 and 
Haritaworns, 2008).  
Another important aspect of the definition is that the rules and organized 
practices are affected by idiosyncratic preferences, expectations of the individual 
and changing external circumstances. Institutions, as I understand it, are more than 
formal rules and the most frequent behaviour. Instead they are affected by internal 
(changing preferences, new ideas, new understanding etc.) and external factors 
(expectations from others, external shocks etc.). In this thesis the focus will be on 
the external factors.  
Now that I have discussed the general idea of institutions and presented my 
understanding of institutions we can continue and discuss different institutional 
theories and their understanding of institutional change. The problem with many 
institutional theories is that they focus on the creation of institutions and not on the 
effects that a change has. This is a problem because this thesis focuses just on that; 
the effects of the change. Therefore we have to force the answers out of the different 
approaches and try to apply some of the theoretical underpinnings to a phenomena 
they have not earlier focused upon. 
The institutional theories I have included in this thesis are rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI) and historical institutionalism (HI). The reason for why I 
have chosen to only include these two theories is because of two reasons. The first 
reason is that many other theories emphasizes on ideas and social constructions 
rather than formal institutions. For example constructivist institutionalism implies 
that institutions do not have much influence on how actors behave (see Bell, 
2011:886-887). Since this thesis only focuses on formal institutions it is redundant 
to use theories which focus on social constructions and discourses. Secondly, these 
two theories are among the most used theories in the area of institutions. Since these 
theories are widely used it becomes important to study aspects in order to develop 
the theories further. 
3.1.2 Rational choice institutionalism  
RCI has several varieties within itself (see Peters, 2005:50), but there is one 
assumption that all share; political action is driven by instrumental rationality 
which means that individuals make decisions based on utility-maximizing choices 
(Weyland, 2002:58-59). The consequence of this assumption is that individuals 
are considered to be the central actors in a political process (Peters, 2005:47 & 
50). Therefore, institutions are the constraints on the individual’s decision making 
process. For instance, the type of electoral rules used in a democratic elections 
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affect the way politicians behave. It is also important to note that some RCI 
scholars look at how individuals shape institutions (see Weyland, 2002:59-60).  
RCI traditionally approaches the concept of institution in two ways. The first 
approach views institutions as an exogenous constraints while the second approach 
see institutions as external provisions (rules provided by the players themselves) 
(Shepsle, 2006:24-26). Furthermore RCI differentiate between structured and 
unstructured institutions. Structured institutions are organizations and rules that are 
robust over time while unstructured institutions are more informal practices which 
are susceptible to change over time (Ibid, 2006:27-28). 
The idea of structured and unstructured institutions leads us to an important 
concept; the concept of collective action. Collective action can be understood as 
“the capacity of a group of individuals to coordinate for mutual advantage” 
(Shepsle, 2006:28). The problem is that some actors will be free-riding, which is 
when an individual abstains in contributing to the outcome (Shepsle, 2006:30). 
Despite this problem groups do form, but the reason why groups are formed is 
debated with some focusing on political entrepreneur’s ability to muster resources 
to enable collective action and others on the aspect of cooperation through the idea 
of repeated prisoner’s dilemma games (see Shepsle, 2006:31-32). 
Change in institutions is not something RCI put a lot of emphasis on since 
“institutions account primarily for pattern maintenance, the preservation of 
structures, and the repetition of behavior—i.e., for stability and even rigidity“ 
(Weyland, 2002:70). Change is primarily viewed as exogenous in RCI rather than 
a continuous process of adjustment (Peters, 2005:61 & Weyland, 2002:70). Since 
RCI does not focus on institutional change (RCI tend to focus on equilibrium 
analysis, see Weyland, 2002:71) there is little focus on how long after a change we 
can expect to see any effects. Some RCI scholars argue that those responsible for 
changing institutions can anticipate every possible effect of the institutional change 
while others state that this is an unrealistic assumption (Weyland, 2002:72). 
While there is debate on whether the designers of institutions can predict every 
possible outcome of an institutional change most RCI scholars agree with the idea 
that institutions are formed on a tabula rasa. This means that when a new institution 
is created or if an institution is in a process of change the past history of the 
institution has little influence on how the institution will develop after the 
foundation or change (Peters, 2005:51). 
One aspect which is related to change is the idea of repeated games. Whenever 
an individual is faced with a situation in which the individual’s decision is 
dependent on other individuals the rational choice strategy changes (see Hollis, 
1994:118-119). If the same game is repeated the individuals will base their current 
strategies on past decisions which might affect what choices an individual will 
make (Shepsle, 2006:31-32).  
There are some weaknesses with RCI. First of all the idea of individuals making 
decisions based on rational choices might not be entirely true since individuals are 
affected by cognitive limitations and psychological limitations  which might make 
the individuals not making a truly rational choices (Shepsle, 2006:33-34).  
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The effects of the change and the expected time period for a change to have an 
effect is not a focal point within RCI. However, since RCI views changes and 
creation of institutions as being built on tabula rasa it can be assumed that we should 
expect to see an effect not long after an institutional change. The individuals will 
change their rational choice strategies to enable a new utility-maximizing strategy. 
The possible effects of an institutional change is not specified within RCI but since 
some RCI scholars assume that the people responsible for institutional change can 
fully predict the possible effects we should be able to see more cohesion in the EU 
(since this was one of the goals with the treaty). It could also have an effect on the 
collective action aspect in which actors are faced with new circumstances which 
affect their strategies. 
3.1.3 Historical institutionalism 
HI, in contrast to RCI, highlights the importance of looking at political interaction 
over time which leads to the idea of path dependency. As institutional change is in 
motion the cost of reversal increases and therefore the process of institutional 
change is dependent on earlier events (Pierson, 2004:20-21). HI considers 
institutions capable of learning from other institutions and from past events which 
means that institutions evolve (as in adapting and modifying) over time (Peters, 
2005:78-79 & Weyland, 2008:283-284). 
Change is analysed with the help of the concept punctured equilibria. When an 
institution is created the institution is expected to be in a state of equilibrium. When 
this equilibrium is ‘punctured’ the institutions start to change (Peterson, 2005:77). 
This highlights the importance of critical junctures which are “moments when 
substantial institutional change takes place thereby creating a ‘branching point’ 
from which historical development moves into a new path” (Hall & Taylor, 
1996:942). Bryan Mabee states that critical junctures are important for two reasons. 
First of all, junctures tend to provide external pressure on the current political order 
which forces those who want to keep the current political order to change the 
institution. Secondly, the junctures allows for greater potential changes since it is 
not only the involved actors interests that are important but also the timing of the 
juncture (2011:30-32). 
It is also important to note what kind of change it is. Three kinds are presented 
by Paul Pierson in the book Politics in time and these are layering, functional 
conversion and diffusion. The layering kind of institutional change is when a part 
of an existing institution is changed. This means that some parts of the old 
institution will be kept while others are removed. Often these kinds of changes are 
made when an institution needs to adapt to a changing social context. It can also 
mean the introduction of new institutional tracks that will overturn the existing 
institution (2004:137-138). The functional conversion kind of institutional change 
is when existing institutions are redirected to new purposes and changes what role 
the institution play. The last kind of institutional change is diffusion which is when 
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an institution is replaced by another entirely new one (Ibid, 2004:138). In relation 
to the treaty of Lisbon it seems to be a layering kind of change since the existing 
institutions are kept but changed to some degree. 
There are some issues with HI’s view on change in that it too easily account for 
change. HI tends to treat institutions as fluid which is not entirely realistic (Greif & 
Laitin, 2004:635) and also has a tendency to be a mechanical and static accounts of 
institutional change that shows signs of determinism (Bell, 2011:885). 
While HI often focuses on institutional change it does not write much about 
how long after a change we can expect to see any effects. The idea of path 
dependency implies that during the period after an institutional change the actors 
will have more freedom in how it can behave in comparison to later periods of the 
institutions lifespan. At the same time HI implies a form of socialization with the 
institutions being able to learn from earlier events and from other institutions. 
In regards to the treaty of Lisbon it is rather clear that it is a layering kind of 
change. Therefore the existing institutions are still on the same path except for a 
few institutional changes. The earlier events of the institutions lifespan should 
therefore affect the institutions after the treaty which suggests that we should not 
expect to see any major changes in how the EU debate and refer to norms. 
3.2 Norms 
The second central concept in this thesis is norms. In this part I will first have a 
general discussion on what norms are and what function they serve. When this has 
been discussed I will decide on a definition of norms that will be used in this thesis. 
Finally, I will discuss and decide what typology of norms I will use.  
3.2.1 What are norms and how do they function? 
The debate surrounding how to define norms is a source of confusion amongst 
scholars. Different scientists tend to use the concept in different ways or use 
concepts other than norms (Interis, 2011:424-425). I will in this thesis focus on 
macro-level norms and not on norms on the micro-level and meso-level (for 
example norms within the field of psychology).  
This leads us to a central question; what exactly is a norm? Many scholars 
provide different kinds of definitions but there is one aspect that almost all 
definitions share: all of the definitions argue that norms prescribe the proper (or 
appropriate) behaviour in a given situation (see Axelrod 1986, Björkdahl 2002a, 
Checkel 1997, Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, Katzenstein 1996 and Morris 1953). 
Norms tell us what is considered to be ‘normal’ and a breach of a norm will create 
a debate among the involved actors (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:892). 
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One example of this concerns the development of a norm against leader 
assassination in world politics. Thomas Ward (2000) discusses in the article 
“Norms and Security. The case of international assassination” how assassination 
has become sort of a taboo in world politics. This is significant since assassination 
could potentially avert a full scale war and/or crimes against humanity. Despite this, 
assassination is frowned upon as something immoral and wrong. 
A common problem with norms is that norms and values are sometimes seen as 
the same. This is understandable since norms often take many forms (Checkel, 
1997:471). For example the norm concerning the idea that agreements should be 
kept can be seen as both legal and moral (Raymond, 1997:225). However, far from 
every norm is actually moral (Björkdahl, 2002b:14). For example the norm 
concerning stopping at a crossing when a red light is shown does not have much 
moral value within itself. By only looking at norms as moral we could miss out on 
important norms in the analysis.  
Richard T. Morris separates between values and norms. Values are, according 
to Morris, “individual, or commonly shared conceptions of the [desirable], i.e. what 
I and/or others feel we justifiably want—what it is felt proper to want.” (1953:610, 
my edits). In contrast, norms are “[generally] accepted, sanctioned prescriptions for, 
or prohibitions against, others' behavior, [belief], or feeling, i.e. what others ought 
to do, believe, feel—or else.” (1953:610, my edits). Norms, according to Morris, 
always include sanctions while values never do (1953:610). The distinction 
between norms and values are important. States and other actors have opinions 
about what values are desirable but values do not themselves have the power to 
assign the appropriate behaviour. At the same time, states might refer to values 
when legitimizing certain behaviour. In order to avoid focusing on the normative 
discussion concerning norms I will follow Morris’s distinction between values and 
norms. 
We now know that norms assign the proper behaviour, but what exact function 
do norms have? Gregory A. Raymond presents in the article “Problems and 
Prospects in the Study of International Norms” four main functions norms have. 
Norms in international politics can function as a source for international action, as 
‘signposts’, as standardization and routinizing procedures, and as ‘tripwires’.  
When norms function as a source for international action it does so in three 
possible ways. They can be constitutive, constraining or enabling. First of all, 
norms are constitutive because they define what meaning something has and give a 
certain action meaning (Raymond, 1973:213-214). For example, the norms 
concerning membership in the UN could be seen as constitutive since the 
membership defines which actors can be considered a sovereign state. Secondly, 
norms constrain the behaviour of actors. This was shortly touched upon earlier in 
that if an actor deviates from a norm others will question the actor’s motives and 
actions. The consequence of this is that norms constrain the behaviour of actors 
since the actors will consider the possible consequences of deviating from a norm 
before doing so. However, norms can still be deviated from (Ibid, 1973:213-
214).Thirdly, norms enable action in that if a norm is breached others might take 
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specific actions against the one(s) whom deviated from the norm (Ibid, 1973:213-
214).  
Norms can also function as “signposts” (a concept coined by Ludwig 
Wittgenstein). Signposts are “heuristic mental aids to warn policymakers of the 
prearranged actions that various states will take under certain circumstances” (Ibid, 
1997:214-215). In other words, when policymakers decide on a certain action they 
will consider the relevant norms present in world politics before making the final 
decision. For example, if policymaker’s wants to invade and annex a neighbouring 
country the policymaker will know that the international community will most 
likely act in specific ways to punish the aggressor.  
Norms also standardizes and routinizes procedures in world politics. Since 
norms assign the proper behaviour, most actors will conform to what is considered 
to be the ‘normal’ behaviour. Certain norms will have certain procedures and 
routines which affect how actors behave (Ibid, 1997:215). For example, the 
emergence of diplomats have standardized the way states interact. Diplomats are, 
according to Hedley Bull, the main communication link between states. Diplomats 
negotiate agreements between states, gather information to their own state and 
minimize the friction between states by observing the correct behaviour (Bull, 
1995:163-166). While the role of diplomats might have changed due to new forms 
of communication (see Bull, 1995:166-172), diplomats still play a large role in 
state-to-state communications and certain routines and procedures have emerged in 
the diplomatic world. 
Norms can also function as a ‘tripwire’. In other words, if a widely accepted 
norm is violated then actions to punish the transgression might be gathered more 
easily than before (Raymond, 1997:215). For example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
transgressed on several important norms and thus the world could more easily unite 
and punish Iraq’s transgression of the relevant norms.  
3.2.2 Defining the concept of norms  
I have now discussed what norms are and in order for this study to achieve a high 
level of validity and reliability I have decided to use a definition used by other 
scientists that I believe best captures my understanding of norms. The definition I 
will use is used by Annika Björkdahl in her dissertation From idea to Norm – 
Promoting Conflict Prevention. Björkdahl’s definition is the following:  
 
“Norms are intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and 
identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behavior ought to 
be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations.” (Björkdahl 2002a:43) 
 
Björkdahl’s definition highlights several important aspects of norms. First of all 
norms are intersubjective because they are a product of social interaction. As 
different actors interact norms emerge that create expectations of how others should 
behave and what possible interests others could have. If an actor goes against these 
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expectations it will cause a debate.  For example, if a democratic country suddenly 
enacts several laws restricting important aspects of a democracy (for example the 
rule of law and freedom of speech) this will go against the identity and expectations 
the country has created for itself. The democratic country can thus be prepared for 
a possible condemnation from other democratic countries. 
 Secondly norms prescribe the appropriate behaviour by referring to values and 
defining rights and obligations. The expectations the actor has created have not 
emerged from a vacuum, but instead are interconnected with other norms. It also 
separates between norms and values. This highlights the importance of looking at 
changes over time and to be aware that norms affect each other. 
3.2.3 Constructing a typology of norms 
In order to study norms in international politics some have tried to construct 
typologies of norms with the aim of finding different types of norms. It is important 
to note that norms often do not strictly confine to just one category but sometime 
have many roles and belong to different categories (Checkel, 1997:471). Two types 
of typologies can most often be identified; horizontal and vertical typologies.  
The horizontal typology looks at different types of norms. Most often two main 
categories are described; constitutive (or social) norms and regulative (or legal) 
norms. Constitutive norms identifies the identity of an actor which in turn prescribe 
what is expected of the actor by others.  In contrast, regulative norms specify and 
assign the proper behaviour for the actor which constrains the actor’s behaviour 
(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:891, Katzenstein 1996:5 and Raymond, 1997:225-
227). Some scholars also argue for a third horizontal type of norms; the prescriptive 
or evaluative norms. The difference between the first two horizontal categories and 
the third one is that prescriptive norms describes what we ought to do (Raymond, 
1997:225). 
In contrast to the horizontal typology the vertical typology often look at the 
hierarchy or level of importance of norms. Some norms play a much larger role in 
the world than other norms and might act as a foundation for other norms. 
Therefore, by looking at what norms are the fundamental ones we can see where 
norms derive their existence from (Raymond, 1997:223). 
Another typology is constructed by Matthew Interis who divides norms into 
sanctioned norms and non-sanctioned norms. The non-sanctioned norms are called 
descriptive norms and are norms that tell us ‘what is done’. The sanctioned norms 
are called injunctive norms and tell us what should be done (2011:431-432).  
The problem with the horizontal, vertical and the Interis typologies concerns 
change. These typologies are good at identifying norms at a cross-section and not 
so much on how norms change over time. It is unlikely that a norm will go from 
being a constitutive norm to being a regulative norm or that the hierarchy of a norm 
will change. It is also unlikely that a norm will go from being non-sanctioned to 
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being sanctioned. We therefore need another typology that is more suitable in 
describing possible changes in certain aspects of norms. 
The typology that I have decided to use is the one that Richard T. Morris 
presents in the article “A Typology of Norms”. The reason for this is because the 
many characteristics that are included in Morris’s typology touch upon what the 
other typologies look at. Morris formulates a classification table where a norms 
characteristics are divided into four aspects; the distribution of norms, the mode of 
enforcement of the norm, the transmission of the norm and the conformity of the 
norm. Each of these aspects have several under characteristics which are rated on a 
one dimensional scale (1953:611-612). This typology enables us to identify norms 
as either absolute or conditional. Absolute norms are norms that are known by all 
and supported by all under all circumstances while conditional norms are only 
known by a few, supported by few and defended sporadically (Morris, 1953:612). 
The problem with Morris’s Typology is how one determines what constitutes 
as absolute or conditional norms. According to Matthew Interis there is no objective 
way to know when a conditional norm goes from being an absolute norm (Interis, 
2011:433). This presents us with a problem concerning reliability since my 
interpretation of a norm might differ from others in regards to identifying it with 
the typology. At the same time, others will still be able to replicate my study 
(discussed more in part 4.5) and determine if the results seems reasonable. 
I will make some minor changes to Morris’s typology in order for the analysis 
to be more specified and avoid redundancy. The removed aspects is the extent of 
knowledge of the norm and the category transmission of the norm. The reason for 
the removal of the extent of knowledge of the norm is because the discussion takes 
place in the first committee in the UN which suggests that the norms are already 
widely known by both subjects and objects (some examples are A/64/C.1/PV.18 
and A/65/C.1/PV.12, page 7). It therefore becomes redundant to study this aspect. 
The reason for why the second category was completely removed was because we 
are only looking at how the EU debate and refers to norms and not how the other 
actors are socialized into accepting the norms. The tweaked typology is presented 
in table 1.  
 
Table 1 – Modified typology of norms 
 
Distribution of norms 
i) Extent of acceptance, agreement with norm: 
(1) By subjects 
(a) By a few………………almost everyone 
(2) By objects 
(a) By a few………………almost everyone 
ii) Extent of application of norms to object: 
(1) To groups or categories 
(a) By a few………………almost everyone 
(2) To conditions 
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(a) In specified few……….in almost all 
 
Mode of enforcement of the norms 
iii) Reward-Punishment 
(1) More reward than punishment……………more punishment than reward 
iv) Severity of sanctions 
(1) Light, unimportant………………heavy, important 
v) Enforcing agency 
(1) Specialized, designated responsibility…..general, universal responsibility 
vi) Extent of enforcement 
(1) Lax, intermittent………………rigorous, uniform  
vii) Source of authority 
(1) Rational, expedient, instrumental………………divine, inherent, absolute, 
autonomous 
viii) Degree of internalization by objects 
(1) Little, external enforcement required……..great, self-enforcement sufficient 
 
Conformity to the norms 
ix) Amount of conformity attempted by objects 
(1) Attempted by very few………………attempted by almost everyone 
x) Amount of deviance by objects 
(1) Very great………………very little 
xi) Kind of deviance 
(1) Formation of patterned idiosyncratic sub-norms……evasion…..deviation 
 
 
I have now discussed different typologies and decided on a tweaked version of 
Morris’s typology. It should be noted that this typology is only a selection of 
characteristics and is not intended to represent every possible characteristics of a 
norm (Morris, 1953:612). Despite the problems with Morris’s typology I believe 
the typology is best suited for this thesis’s aim and purpose. There are some 
problems with how we determine if a norm is absolute or conditional but this is 
minor since the focus is more in identifying a possible change than if a norm is 
absolute or conditional. 
3.3 Challenges with the theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this study has some issues that needs to be discussed. 
One issue is grounded in a philosophy of science discussion and deals with the 
challenge of understanding norms. For example norms are understandings that 
constitute an actor’s interest and identities, but how can we analyse an identity? 
A common view in philosophy is science is that “science is derived from facts” 
(Chalmers, 2004:1) which means that science is when we can observe and conduct 
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experiments on a phenomena (Ibid, 2004:1). The problem with norms is that there 
are some aspects which are unmeasurable and unobservable. For example how can 
we measure and observe an individual’s expectations of another individual?  
There has been attempts to circumvent the problem of not being able of 
measuring the unobservable. Behavioural scientists argue that since norms are the 
typical behaviour of actors we could measure this behaviour and see how often a 
certain behaviour is observed (Raymond, 1997:217). However, is the observed 
amount of a behaviour a good indication of a norms influence over behaviour? 
My stance on the issue is that by only measuring the frequency of a behaviour 
we risk missing key aspects of the function of norms. As Andrew Sayer states in 
the book Realism and Social Science; “Meaning has to be understood, it cannot be 
measured or counted, and hence there is always an interpretative or hermeneutic 
element in social science” (2000:17). At the same time, we should not ignore the 
possibility of measuring the frequency of a norm within official document since an 
important norm could be expected to be more present than other norms, but some 
form of hermeneutic element is still needed in connection to a quantitative analysis. 
This leads us to another issue that needs to be addressed; can we achieve an 
objective understanding of norms, especially if some aspects are unobservable? 
This is a philosophy of science discussion where some argue that while knowledge 
is selective we can achieve a somewhat objective knowledge of the world. In other 
words, we are not confined into an iron cage of social constructions (Sayer, 
2000:53-55).  However, this position risks assuming that the scientist is detached 
from the research and can assume a passive role whom is not affected by the 
scientist’s biases and social constructions. As Alfred Schuetz illustrate in the 
following quote:  
 
"All our knowledge of the world, in common sense as well as in scientific thinking, 
involves constructs, namely, a set of abstractions, generalizations, formalizations, 
idealizations specific to the respective level of thought organization. Strictly speaking, 
there are no such things as facts, pure and simple. All facts are from the outset facts selected 
from a universal context by the activities of our mind." (Schuetz, 1953:2) 
 
We need to be aware that our knowledge is situated in that our background, 
experiences, understandings and expectations affect our perspectives (see 
Haritaworns, 2008). This highlights the importance of being aware of one’s biases.  
Since norms contain some aspects which are unobservable and refers to certain 
values our preconceived ideas can affect how we interpret the significance of a 
change in how norms are debated. This presents us with an issue that needs to be 
discussed; can we achieve true objective knowledge about a phenomena when our 
social constructions affect how we perceive reality? 
My stance on this is that while it is hard to achieve true objective knowledge of 
the world I do believe that if we use a scientific approach, are aware of our biases 
and are open with our analysis we can achieve a somewhat objective knowledge of 
the world. In order to as much as possible avoid the problems concerning personal 
biases I will use a typology of norms as my analytical tool for this thesis (which is 
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discussed in part 3.2.4). While the typology might not eradicate the problems 
related to the observer it does enable others to follow the logic that leads up to the 
conclusion. The typology also grants us a higher level of reliability, something 
which is discussed more in part 4.5.  
Despite all the challenges with the theoretical framework I still believe that the 
framework is sufficient for this thesis’s purpose. I share Patrick Thaddeus Jacksons 
opinion in which he argues that as long as science is done in a systematic way, is 
open for public criticism and has the ambition of producing ‘worldly knowledge’ 
(see Jackson, 2011:194-195 for an elaboration on what worldly knowledge is)  then 
we are conducting ‘good’ science (Jackson, 2011:193-194). There are problems 
with the epistemological aspects of the study due to the study’s interpretive nature 
(which affects the study’s reliability) but as long as we are open with how we 
interpret it, try to produce some worldly knowledge and are open for public 
criticism then the philosophical issues are less problematic.  
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4 Methodological discussion 
In this part I will first discuss this thesis’s research design. The design will be the 
guiding light which will determine what case(s) will be analysed, what methods 
will be used and what empirical material will be gathered. After that I will discuss 
the method I have chosen for this thesis and what empirical material will be 
gathered. Finally I will discuss what agenda items will be analysed and issues 
concerning validity and reliability. 
4.1 Research design 
One of the most important steps in a study is the research design since this will 
shape of the study. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett formulates five tasks 
in a research design in the book Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences and I will use these tasks as inspiration for my own design. While I present 
the tasks from one to five it is important to note that these tasks are integrated 
(George & Bennett, 2005:88).  
The first task is to specify the problem and research objective (George & 
Bennett, 2005:74) in order for the aim of the study to become clear. The research 
problem and objective has already been discussed (see part 1.1), but we need a 
general idea of what type of study design we want. George and Bennett presents six 
different kinds of theory developing designs (Ibid, 2005:75-76) and with the 
guidance of these kinds of studies I have decided that my study will be inspired by 
the discipline configurative type of theory developing design. This type of theory 
developing design entails using established theories to explain a case. These kinds 
of studies also have a certain level of theory testing since the theories used should 
be able to explain the outcome (Ibid, 2005:75). As discussed in the theoretical 
framework the theories will be RCI, HI and CI. 
The next task that George and Bennett recommend to follow is to specify the 
variables. We need to know which variables are the dependent (y) ones and which 
are the independent (x) ones. When we know the y and the x’s we can decide which 
of the x’s that is will be held constant to enable comparison between cases included 
in the study (Ibid, 2005:79). While this study does not fully fit into George and 
Bennett’s view science (in that we can specify and isolate variables) I will still try 
to follow the logic of independent and dependent variables in this thesis to enable 
others to understand my reasoning. The independent variables in this study will be 
the institutional changes prescribed in the treaty of Lisbon while the dependent 
variable will be the norms I analyse. Changes in the dependent variable is 
determined with the help of the typology of norms discussed in part 3.2.4.  
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The third task George and Bennett recommend us to follow is the case selection 
process. Case selection is important since it will help us to achieve well-defined 
objectives to work towards (Ibid, 2005:83). The case selection strategy is discussed 
more in depth in part 4.1.1.  
The fourth task is to describe the variance in the variables. This is helpful for us 
because the significance of the results are dependent on how we describe the 
variance. We can either describe the variance in either qualitative or quantitative 
terms (Ibid, 2005:84-86). The description of the variance is determined by the 
typology presented in the theoretical framework. A change is when at least one 
aspect of the typology differs significantly from at least two points in time.  
The fifth and last task is to formulate the data requirements and tackle some 
important general questions. When we have discussed and decided on important 
aspects of task 1-4 we have a general idea of the research design. This general idea 
leads us to important discussions of what kind of material we will analyse and with 
what kind of method(s). We also need to be clear on what philosophy of science 
position we have during the study in order to avoid being philosophically confused 
(Ibid, 2005:86-88). The philosophy of science issues are discussed in part 3.3, the 
choice of method and empirical data is discussed in part 4.3 and 4.4, and validity 
and reliability issues are discussed in part 4.5.  
4.1.1 Case selection strategy 
One of the most important parts in a study is the selection of cases. The selection 
of certain cases can drastically change the results which in turn have implications 
for the thesis as a whole. The first question we need to tackle is the one concerning 
analysing a large amount of cases (large-N analysis), a small amount of cases 
(small-N analysis) or conducting a case study.  
In light of the research question (presented in part 1) this study will be a case 
study. The case in question will be the EU debating norms during different time 
periods (more specifically before and after the treaty of Lisbon). Thus, this study is 
a form of comparative case study (see Esaiasson et al, 121-122) where the case is 
compared between different periods of time.  
One could ask the question of why conduct a case study of the EU and not a 
comparative study between similar organizations whom have underwent similar 
institutional changes. First of all there are few organizations whom are comparable 
with the EU and have underwent similar institutional changes. Therefore the EU is 
a unique case. Secondly there has not been many studies on the possible link 
between institutional change and changes in how norms are debated and referred 
to. Therefore it is beneficial to conduct a case study to see if there are any possible 
links and other possible variables. If there is a possible link then it would be a good 
idea to increase the number of cases and strengthen the possible causal relation.  
Another important question concerns the selection of the treaty of Lisbon. The 
EU has had several treaties that have introduced several important institutional 
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changes like the Maastricht treaty, so why choose the treaty of Lisbon? The reason 
I have chosen the treaty of Lisbon is because it is the newest treaty in the EU. This 
makes the treaty important to study since the effects of the treaty is relevant to us 
today. While looking at the effects from an earlier treaty might give us insight on 
how institutional change affect norms the results will most likely have little 
relevance for us today (however, it is important to note that the theoretical insights 
gained from these types of studies could be argued to be timeless). 
There are several benefits with a case study design. First of all a case study (and 
small-N analyses) achieves a high level of conceptual validity (George & Bennett, 
2005:19-20) since we can work with thick concepts. These kinds of concepts are 
concepts that “cannot be reduced to a single indicator without losing some 
important part of their meaning” (Coppedge, 1999:468) and “are often 
multidimensional, because no aspect of the concept is reducible to any of the others” 
(Coppedge, 1999:468). The problem with statistical studies (or large-N studies) is 
that we risk conceptual stretching which is when we increase a concepts intention 
while keeping the concepts extension the same and vice versa (see Collier & 
Mahoney, 1993:846). Case studies are also beneficial since it enables us to use 
complex theories that are sensitive to space and time (Coppedge, 1999:471-473). 
The second benefit is that case studies are good at deriving new hypotheses. By 
using a case study design we can explore several possible variables which could 
explain why a case might be a deviant or outlier case (George and Bennett, 2005:20-
21). This is beneficial for this thesis since the effects of an institutional change has 
not been widely studied in social science. 
The third benefit is that case studies are good at exploring causal mechanisms. 
Due to only focusing on a single case we can study several possible causal 
mechanisms (Ibid, 2005:21). This is not the focus of this thesis, but it is still 
important to keep in mind. 
The fourth benefit is that case studies allows us to accommodate complex causal 
relations. Equifinity (when many different causal paths leads to the same outcome, 
see George & Bennett, 2005:209), path dependency and similar complex causal 
relations can be hard for large N-analyses to accommodate for (Ibid, 2005:22). 
However, as George and Bennett point out, this is only a relative advantage rather 
than an absolute advantage since case studies “produce generalizations that are 
narrower or more contingent” (George & Bennett, 2005:22).   
While case studies have several advantages there are weaknesses that we need 
to be aware of. One challenge concerns selection bias which is “commonly 
understood as occurring when some form of selection process in either the design 
of the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences 
that suffer from systematic error” (David Collier and James Mahoney quoted in 
George & Bennett, 2005:23). It could be that a researcher has deliberately chosen a 
case that fits into the researcher’s preconceived idea of the possible result and thus 
producing the desired results for the researcher (George and Bennett, 2005:22-25). 
Selection bias can also cause the researcher to either understate or overstate the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variable. At the same time, 
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selection bias can be beneficial since knowledge about a case can help us establish 
new possible explanations and understandings of a case (Ibid, 2005:24-25).  
In order to decrease the possibility of selection bias and increase the 
generalizability of the study one could randomize the case selection process (see 
Teorell & Svensson, 2007:84). In this thesis a randomized selection process is not 
desirable nor appropriate since I am interested in the effects of the institutional 
changes in the treaty of Lisbon. I have therefore made a strategic choice of the case 
to study (see Teorell & Svensson, 2007:84). Selection bias is therefore something 
we need to be aware of and be careful with the implications of the results. 
Another challenge is the identification of the conditions in how variables affect 
the outcome and to what degree. While case studies are stronger in assessing 
“whether and how a variable mattered to the outcome” (George & Bennett, 2005:25, 
their italics) they are weaker in assessing “how much it mattered.” (George & 
Bennett, 2005:25, their italics). While this is an issue it is not a problem in this 
thesis since the focus is to see if institutional change affect norms, not how much 
the institutional change affects norms. 
The lack of representativeness is another relevant issue. Since this thesis is a 
case study it is problematic to argue that the results will be generalizable. It is 
therefore important to not overgeneralize the results (George & Bennett, 2005:30-
32). However, this is not a problem for this thesis since the EU is unique with few 
comparable organizations. This study does not aim to generalize the results but 
rather explore the possible links between institutional change and norms. Thus, the 
lack of representativeness is not a major concern. 
Another issue is the risk of single-case studies to be indeterminate when 
confronted with more than one possible explanation. While this is a potential 
problem it could be used to a studies advantage by having theory developing 
ambitions or analysing multiple observations from a single case (George & Bennett, 
2005:32-33). I do not see indetermination as a problem for this thesis since I have 
already stated that I am only exploring possible links and not to determine exactly 
what causes actors to change how they debate norms. 
The last weakness that needs to be addressed is the potential lack of 
independence of the included cases. This is a common critique from those whom 
prefer large-N analyses (George & Bennett, 2005:33-34), but I do not see this as a 
problem for this thesis due to the fact that norms and institutions do not exist in a 
vacuum (as discussed in the theoretical framework). Since this thesis will study an 
institutional change it is problematic to assume that the different time periods are 
independent from each other. 
I have now discussed the strengths and weaknesses with conducting a case 
study. The next step is to discuss what time periods will be analysed. Since this 
thesis focuses on the effects of the institutional changes prescribed in the treaty of 
Lisbon we need to look at time periods before and after the adoption of the treaty. 
I have decided that the time period 2007/2008 to 2012/2013 will be analysed. 
While I believe that this time period is optimal one could argue that if we 
analyse a longer time period we could achieve a better understanding on if 
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institutional change affect how actor’s debate norms since some norms might be 
harder for actors to change their stance on. While this objection is valid I have two 
points that argues against this. The first point is that the focus is on the institutional 
change in the treaty of Lisbon, which makes it unnecessary to look too far back in 
time since this will tell us little about the effects the changes the treaty could have 
caused. The second point concerns comparability. By comparing time periods too 
far in the past we risk analysing contexts whom share little to no context with each 
other. The time period is suitable for this thesis’s purpose since the context will be 
relatively similar between the first and the last period in time. 
4.2 Content analysis 
All research problems can be approached by many different ways, but the decision 
is dependent on what the aim of study is and what we want to achieve knowledge 
about. I have already discussed what the aim of the study is and what I want to 
study. The next step is to decide on a suitable method to tackle the research problem. 
I have decided to use a form content analysis to approach the research problem. 
The method has a wide variety of forms but one definition is formulated by Klaus 
Krippendorff who defines the method as “a research technique for making 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (and other meaningful matter) to the 
contexts of their use” (2004:18). Krippendorff raises several important points 
regarding the epistemological foundation he bases his definition on. First of all, 
Krippendorff argues that texts “have no objective – that is, no reader-independent 
– qualities” (2004:22, his italics). This means that a text is always interpret 
differently by others due to having different understandings of concepts, meaning 
and symbols. In short, people cannot understand a text identically. This is important 
to keep in mind since others might read my chosen empirical material and 
understand the material different from me. 
Secondly, texts have several meanings and cannot be ‘found’, ‘described’ or 
‘identified’. Similar to the first point, people approach and understand texts 
differently. Every person might have valid accounts of a text but they will most 
likely be different from each other (Ibid, 2004:22-23). This is very important to be 
aware of since my interpretation might differ from others which means I cannot 
present the results as the one single true interpretation of a text. At the same time, 
by being transparent in how we analyse the documents we can at least achieve an 
intersubjective understanding. 
Thirdly, “The meanings invoked by texts need not be shared” (Ibid, 2004:23, his 
italics). What Krippendorff argues is that if we cannot share the meaning of a text 
then a content analysis would be utterly pointless (2004:23). While I share 
Krippendorff’s position in that it is not necessary to find a common ground with the 
authors and audiences of a text I still believe that we need to be careful when 
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analysing texts so we do not under- or overestimate the significance of symbols in 
a text. 
Fourthly, texts speak of meaning other than the given text. We cannot rely on 
computers to analyse a text since texts often refer to objects that do not exist 
anymore, distant events, ideas and other aspects which are not measurable (Ibid, 
2004:23). Again, this highlights the problem of the interpreter of the text because 
everyone understand a text differently. To avoid too many problems with personal 
biases I will try to be open with what material I analyse, how I interpret the results 
and use the typology of norms (presented in part 3.2.4) to show the reasoning behind 
my analysis and conclusions. This enables others to replicate my study and see if 
the results are reasonable. 
Fifthly, texts do not exist in a vacuum but rather the meaning invoked in the 
texts are affected by other texts, discourses and contexts (Ibid, 2004:24). We 
therefore need to be aware that texts use symbols, concepts and meaning tied to a 
specific context. Later texts will most likely be affected by earlier texts. So while I 
analyse the texts separately and compare the results we still need to keep in mind 
that they are not independent from each other and from other texts. 
Lastly, the texts never speak for themselves but inform someone. Depending on 
what texts we look at we can expect that it will have different idea of what the 
potential audience is (Ibid, 2004:24-25). Potential issues concerning this will be 
discussed in part 4.4. 
Now that we have a general idea of what a content analysis is we need to decide 
whether the method will be more inclined towards a quantitative or a qualitative 
approach. It should be noted that while I present the content analysis as qualitative 
and quantitative there is not a dichotomy between these two (May, 2011:213). 
The quantitative content analysis is used to find patterns and regularities in a 
large amount of data (Ibid, 2011:209). This is useful when we have a large quantity 
of documents that we want to analyse, something that would take a long time with 
more qualitative methods (Esaiasson et al, 2010:224-225). While quantitative 
content analysis enables us to analyse a large quantity of documents we lose some 
important insights (as touched upon in part 3.3). The quantitative content analysis 
inform us greatly of the product, but little of the process behind the product. (May, 
2011:210). This is a problem because one of the aim of this thesis is to look at how 
institutional change has affected how the EU debates and refer to norms.  
Another problem is related to the operationalization of norms. Since statistical 
methods is used the concepts used need to be defined, standardized and categorized 
(Ibid, 2011:210). This means that anything that is not observable is excluded from 
the analysis which is a major issue since norms have aspects which are 
unobservable.  
The qualitative content analysis share some similarities with the quantitative 
content analysis in that both methods systematically analyse a document of some 
sort. In contrast with the quantitative content analysis the qualitative content 
analysis does not count or measure the content (Boréus & Bergström, 2005:44). 
Instead, the focus is on the process and social context. The author(s) of the 
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documents become a part of the study because they address an audience in a specific 
context (May, 2010:211). The weakness with the qualitative content analysis is the 
process of interpreting the texts. This was discussed in part 3.4 and is a fundamental 
philosophy of science question. Since two people interpret the same text differently 
we will most likely achieve different understandings of a text which in turn affect 
our conclusions. This is a problem since others might not be able to replicate my 
thesis and achieve similar results. At the same time if we use an analytical tool, use 
empirical material which others have access to and are open with how we interpret 
the text other will be able to replicate the study as well as being able to assess if the 
conclusions are reasonable. 
The design of the content analysis will be similar to one of the designs presented 
by Klaus Krippendorff in the book Content Analysis - An Introduction to Its 
Methodology. Since the aim of this study is to understand how institutional changes 
affect how the EU debate and refers to norms I will analyse texts from before and 
after the institutional change has occurred. The first step is to gather relevant texts, 
the second step is to analyse the texts and the last step is to compare the results of 
the analysis. This is referred to by Krippendorff as “Comparing Similar Phenomena 
Inferred From Different Texts” (2004:93). 
In light of the previous discussion I have decided to use a method inspired by 
qualitative content analysis. While a quantitative content analysis would be useful, 
due to the large amount of data, I believe that we lose too much of the nuances in 
the texts if we are forced to quantify the included concepts. The different texts will 
be analysed on a year basis with the help of the typology of norms. The results from 
each year will then be compared to see if we can find any changes between the 
different years. A change is when one or more aspects of norms has changed 
between at least two periods in time. 
4.3 Empirical material 
Now that I have discussed the research design and what kind of method will be used 
the next step is to discuss what kind of data will be analysed. Since the method used 
is a form of content analysis the material will be some form of content that can be 
analysed. Written material is most often associated with documents (for example 
laws, declarations and transcripts), but some also consider other form of media as 
documents (for example movies, photographs and recorded speeches) (May, 
2010:194-195). 
Since the aim of this thesis is to study how the treaty of Lisbon has affected how 
the EU refers to and discusses norms we need to analyse documents which capture 
this phenomena. I have decided that the documents will be transcripts of speeches 
made by or on behalf of the EU in the UN since I believe this is the best way to 
track changes in how the EU debate and refer to norms. 
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The reason for why the UN was chosen was because of two reasons. First of all 
the UN often discuss the same topic every year which makes the comparison over 
time easier and less distorted by current international events. Secondly the UN is a 
global arena where every UN member state and other actors are often able to join 
in the discussions and access the meeting records. The actors whom speak at the 
UN will be aware of this. 
One problem arises when we look at the transcripts available through the UN. 
Each meeting record in the UN has an index which informs of several important 
aspects (see Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2011:5). The most important aspect is the 
last part of the index which tells us if the meeting record is a verbatim record 
(abbreviated to PV) or a summary report (abbreviated to SR). The difference 
between these two types is that the PV is the full account of the meeting while the 
SR is a summarizing report of the meeting (Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2014a). 
The problem is that the principle organs and selected subsidiary are only allowed 
to have either PVs or SRs (Dag Hammarskjöld Library, 2014a) and out of the 
committees in the UN it is only the first committee that have PVs (Dag 
Hammarskjöld Library, 2014b). This means that I only have access (through the 
UN) to primary documents (documents which are written by authors whom have 
witnessed the events described in the document) from the first committee and 
secondary documents (documents are written by authors whom have written about 
the event/process after it has happened and whom have not personally witnessed 
the event/process) from the 2nd-6th committees (see May, 2010:196-197). 
Primary documents are often seen as most reliable because the author(s) wrote 
the document close to the event both in space and time. These documents are 
therefore less distorted. Secondary documents are less reliable due to the fact that 
the one(s) producing the document has not witnessed the event/process. This means 
that the author(s) might ignore some important aspects of an event/process (May, 
2010:196-197). This highlights the notion that the meaning and significance of a 
sentence can change depending on how the sentence is phrased. For example in 
critical discourse analysis the sentence ‘it could be raining’ and ‘it will rain’ have 
two different levels modality (see Jørgensen & Phillips, 2000:87-88) where the first 
sentence makes a weaker claim of truth than the second one. 
The EU does have some full transcripts from meetings in the 2nd to 6th 
committees during the relevant UNGA, but the problem is that the EU delegation 
at the UN and the EU member states delegations at the UN do not have all 
transcripts available from before the adoption of the treaty of Lisbon. In light of this 
issue I have decided to only analyse the first committee. This is a problem since 
changes in the other committees are not included in the analysis. At the same time, 
the SRs are not appropriate to use as the empirical data due to the nuances that are 
lost which can have dire consequences for the analysis. If we include empirical data 
that does not correctly reflect the EU’s official position we risk making incorrect 
conclusions. 
Before I conclude the discussion on the empirical data I will address some 
general issues. First of all, I will only analyse transcripts which are in English or 
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Swedish since I am only proficient in these languages. This can cause problems 
since some countries in the EU use their own language during their speeches at 
UNGA which means that some nuances can be lost in translation. Secondly, I 
cannot say anything about the implicit norms. While the EU might officially support 
norms in the UNGA the EU might have other unofficial norms and interests it 
actually supports. For example, the EU’s commitment to peacekeeping operations 
might be an excuse to exert pressure for future trade gains. 
Despite all the problems with the empirical data I still believe that the UN-
documents are the most ideal data for this study. The benefits outweigh the 
downsides of the data since the data is easily compared over time and fits into this 
thesis’s purpose. I am aware that there are issues concerning only looking at one 
committee, the nuances lost in translation and the hidden aspects of norms, but the 
documents from the UN are the most appropriate if we want to study how states 
refer to and discuss norms in international politics. 
4.4 What agenda items should be analysed? 
Another important task that needs to be discussed is to decide if every topic should 
be analysed of only a selected few. This is not an easy task since depending on what 
choices we make it can drastically change the outcome of the study.  
The ideal goal would be to study every topic in every committee during every 
UNGA since we would be able to monitor changes in every committee, but due to 
problems with the transcripts (see part 4.3) and the comprehensive task of analysing 
such a massive amount of data this becomes unrealistic. At the same time, by 
choosing to only focus on one topic might be too narrow and also presents us with 
the problem of selection bias and generalizability. Another relevant problem is that 
the topic I choose might not be a topic that the EU consider to be as important as I 
might believe it is. However, while the EU might not consider a topic as important 
the aim of this thesis is to study if some sort of change has occurred regardless of 
topic discussed. 
The criteria for choosing topics to analyse is that the topic has to be discussed 
during every included UNGA. This is to enable comparison between different 
points in time. This will be done by comparing topics at the index of speeches that 
the UN compile after each UNGA. As discussed earlier I will only look at topics 
discussed in the first committee. 
I have decided that I will focus on the topic of nuclear disarmament. This means 
that speeches concerning the general debate on disarmament, weapons of mass 
destruction, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear weapons testing and nuclear 
disarmament will be analysed. The reason for this choice it twofold. First of all the 
topic of nuclear disarmament was discussed during every UNGA. Secondly the 
topic deals with countries who do not fully conform to many of the international 
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conventions which makes it interesting to see if the treaty of Lisbon has changed 
how the EU debate and refer to the norms present in the debate. 
4.5 Validity and reliability  
In the realm of science we are dependent on our analytical tools and concepts in 
order to understand the world around us. Therefore it is a problem if these tools and 
concepts have problems with validity and reliability. 
Validity and reliability are related to two errors of measurement; systematic and 
unsystematic. Systematic errors of measurement are errors which are repeated in a 
predictable way. For example, if we define democracy as ‘allowing elections’ and 
nothing more we will find that some authoritarian countries will be considered 
democracies when in reality they are not. If we are able to avoid systematic errors 
of measurement then we have a good level of validity (Teorell & Svensson, 
2007:55-57). This thesis has a good level of validity since the comparison between 
the theoretical definitions and the operationalization is close and there is an absence 
of any systematic errors of measurement (see Esaiasson et al, 2010:63).  
Unsystematic errors of measurement are errors which are random and 
unpredictable. For example, depending on how we formulate a survey question we 
might achieve different unpredictable answers due to people understanding the 
question differently. If we are able to avoid unsystematic errors of measurement 
then we have achieved a good level of reliability (Teorell, 2007:55-57).  
This study has some issues with reliability which needs to be addressed. As 
discussed in part 3.3 and 4.2 there are some hermeneutic aspects of this thesis which 
means that the way I analyse a text will most likely differ from others. This suggests 
problems with reliability since others might not be able to achieve the same results 
as me. At the same time others will be able to replicate my method by using the 
same material and theoretical tools and achieve similar results (see Esaiasson et al, 
2010:70-71). Thus, while issues concerning reliability is something to keep in mind 
it is not a problem since the empirical material and theoretical tools are accessible 
by others. 
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5 Analysis 
The analysis will be presented by dividing the UNGAs on a year basis. The different 
UNGAs will be analysed by using the typology presented in the theoretical 
framework. When the different UNGAs have been analysed I will compare the 
results from each UNGA and see of the norms have changed. During the analysis 
several abbreviations is used. The meaning of the abbreviations can be found in the 
list of abbreviation in the beginning of this thesis.  
5.1 The 62nd UNGA 
The 62nd UNGA spanned between 2007 and 2008. During the debates the EU made 
statements during the 10th (17 October 2007), 17th (25 October 2007), 22nd (30 
October 2007) and 23rd (31 October 2007) meetings. All statements were made by 
Ambassador Pereira Gomes from the delegation of Portugal and all statements were 
held in English. During the statements made by the EU two main norms can be 
identified; the norm of non-proliferation and the norm of nuclear disarmament. 
Other norms like the norm of nuclear-free zones can also be found but are not as 
much discussed as the other two (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 6).  
Concerning the first category of the typology of norms the extent of acceptance 
by the subject and objects seems to not be universal. While the majority seem to 
accept the norms of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament there are some UN 
member states that do not seem to conform to the norms. We get an idea of the 
magnitude of acceptance in the statement made during the 23rd meeting. During the 
meeting the EU stated that “the EU conducted an extensive campaign lobbying all 
States that have not ratified the Treaty [referring to the CTBT] — the 10 Annex 2 
States and 34 non-Annex 2 States — earlier this year.” (A/C.1/62/PV.23, page 6, 
my edit). The main focus of the statement is towards the annex 2 countries which 
are countries who participated in the CTBT between 1994 and 1996, and possessed 
a nuclear reactor or nuclear research during that time. This suggests that the norm 
concerning non-proliferation is not universally accepted among the UN member 
states.  
The quote also touch upon the extent of application of the norms. It is clear that 
the EU promotes the universalization of the CTBT which suggests that the norm of 
non-proliferation can be considered to be applicable to every member states and 
under any condition. The EU does not state any conditions or any special categories 
that are allowed to deviate from the norm. However, the EU clearly states that it is 
not against the peaceful use of nuclear energy (see A/C.1/62/PV.23, page 4). The 
extent of application concerning the norm of nuclear disarmament is also true.  
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If we continue to the second category of the typology of norm we get an idea of 
the mode of enforcement. Throughout the UNGA there are two countries which 
seem to be deviating from the norms of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament; 
Iran and North Korea. When discussing Iran the EU seem to argue for a mix of 
reward and punishment. The EU highlights several times during its statements that 
Iran’s inability to negotiate a solution will result in a loss of confidence from the 
international community (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 4 and A/C.1/62/PV.22, page 
2). During a statement in the 10th meeting the EU “urge Iran to consider the 
generous and far-reaching proposals made to them in June 2006, which would 
reaffirm Iran’s rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy” (A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 
5). This statement seem to be a mix of reward and punishment as it reaffirms that if 
Iran fulfils the requirements of the Security Council (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 5) 
they will be free to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  
In the case of North Korea they are urged by the EU to “observe the obligations 
of the NPT, to sign and ratify the CTBT, to refrain from any further tests of a nuclear 
device and to re-establish the moratorium on long-range missile testing” 
(A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 5). The EU does however welcome the fact that North 
Korea had “shut down its reactor at Yongbyon and admitted IAEA inspectors” (A/ 
A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 5). This suggests that if North Korea would conform to the 
relevant treaties the world would achieve better relations with North Korea. 
Therefore it is a mix of reward and punishment. 
The other countries which have not signed and/or ratified the relevant treaties 
are harder to determine since they have not directly deviated from the norms, merely 
evading. No ‘severe’ sanctions can therefore not be found. In regards to the severity 
of sanctions against Iran and North Korea there are sanctions (for example 
resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and 
resolution 1718 (2006)) put in place (see A/C.1/62/PV.2, page 5).  The EU urges 
Iran and North Korea to negotiate with the international community, to adopt and 
ratify the relevant conventions and resolutions, and conform to IAEA’s 
recommendations.  
By looking at the EU’s statements we see that the EU underlines that non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament is a universal responsibility. For instance 
during the 12th meeting the EU stated that “The proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction and their means of delivery remains a growing threat to international 
peace and security which requires a global approach” (A/C.1/62/PV.12, page 15). 
The EU also specified Russia’s and USA’s responsibility in reducing their nuclear 
weapons arsenal (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 6) and called for Iran and North Korea 
to conform to the international community’s demand. Most often the EU urges the 
other UN member states to take their responsibility and conform to the norms (see 
A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 6, A/C.1/62/PV.12, page 15). 
The extent of the enforcement is hard to determine. Regarding Iran and North 
Korea the extent of enforcement seems to be uniform since the Security Council 
has adopted resolutions against these countries (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 4 & 5). 
Concerning the countries who have not signed and/or ratified the relevant treaties 
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the EU mainly urges these countries to comply and there does not seem to be a 
rigorous response from the EU. The EU also is concerned that the CTBTO 
preparatory commission’s financial stability which could threaten the CTBT’s 
verification system (see A/C.162/PV.23, page 6) which suggests that the extent of 
enforcement is somewhat lax. Therefore it seems to be a mix of lax and rigorous 
enforcement depending on how much a country deviate from the norms.  
Throughout the 62nd UNGA the EU rarely talk about an absolute source of 
authority, instead the EU refer to instrumental sources of authority like the CTBT 
(see A/C.1/62/PV.23, page 6, A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 6, A/C.1/62/PV.23, page 6), 
the NPT (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 3), The HCOC (A/C.1/62/PV.12, page 17) and 
relevant resolutions like the Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 
(2006) (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 4, A/C.1/62/PV.12, page 15). There are also 
some discussions about the START 1 and Moscow treaty (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, 
page 6). 
The degree of internalization seem to be medium and some external 
reinforcement is needed. One way that this external reinforcement is achieved is 
through the IAEA and during the 10th meeting the EU stated that it reaffirmed its 
full support for the IAEA’s work and recognized the IAEA’s global role to prevent 
the spread of nuclear weapons (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 4). This becomes clear 
when the EU discussed Iran’s nuclear program by stating that the confidence of Iran 
needed to cooperate with IAEA and implement IAEA’s work plan (see 
A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 4-5). Other sources of external enforcement is the UN 
Security Council (see A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 4 & 5) and to some extent the CTBTO 
(see A/C.1/62/PV.23, page 6). Despite the deviation from Iran and North Korea the 
majority of the UN member states seem to conform (to some degree) to the norms, 
at least the EU does not state the opposite, which suggests that self-enforcement is 
mostly sufficient.  
The last category of the typology is the conformity to the norms. As discussed 
earlier the amount of conformity is questionable since there are countries whom 
have not signed or ratified the CTBT and/or the NPT (see A/C.1/62/PV.23, page 6) 
and deviate from the norms (like Iran and North Korea) which argues against the 
idea that everyone attempts to conform to the norms of non-proliferation and 
nuclear disarmament. At the same time the majority of the UN member states have 
signed the treaties which suggests that most of the UN member states attempt to 
conform to the norms. The amount of deviance is small and mostly confined to Iran 
and North Korea. These two countries deviate from the norm which the EU several 
times highlight during its statements (one example is A/C.1/62/PV.10, page 4-5). 
The countries which have not signed the relevant treaties could be interpret as an 
evasion of the norms since these countries are not accused by the EU as trying to 
develop, distribute and/or use nuclear weapons. 
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5.2 The 63rd UNGA 
The 63rd UNGA was held between 2008 and 2009. The EU made statements during 
the 2nd (6 October 2008), 8th (14 October 2008), 11th (17 October 2008) and 16th 
(23 October 2008) meetings. Almost every statement was made by Ambassador 
Eric Danon of the delegation of France except the one during the 16th meeting which 
was made by Deputy Permanent Representative of France Sophie Moal-Makame. 
Every statement was held in French. During the discussions two main norms are 
referred to by the EU; the norm of nuclear disarmament and the norm of non-
proliferation. The norm of nuclear-free zones are also discussed but not as 
extensively (see A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 11-12). 
If we start with the first category of the typology, the distribution of norms, we 
can note that the acceptance of the norms is debatable. This is highlighted in 
statements during the 8th (see A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 9) and 11th meetings (see 
A/C.1/63/PV.11, page 8). For instance, during the 11th meeting the EU stated that 
“Already 130 States have subscribed to the Code [referring to the HCOC] and the 
European Union urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to it as soon as 
possible.” (A/C.1/63/PV.11, page 7, my edit). Thus, the notion that not all UN 
member states have signed and/or ratified the relevant treaties is an indication that 
there is not a universal acceptance of the norms of non-proliferation and nuclear 
disarmament. The EU also devote time toward discussing the three main deviates 
from the norms; Iran, North Korea and Syria (see A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 10). 
Concerning nuclear disarmament Russia and the USA are discussed by the EU 
whom urges the states to reduce their nuclear arsenal in accordance to international 
treaties and the post-START discussion (A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 10). 
The extent of application of the norms seems to be universal. For instance the 
EU stated that it supported the universal non-proliferation based on the NPT and 
the IAEA (see A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 9). Another example is when the EU discussed 
the HCOC and stated that “The EU considers that it is necessary to reaffirm the 
Code’s clear, multilateral and universal purpose” (A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 17). The 
statements made by the EU suggests that the norms are applicable on every state 
and by undermining the norms the function of the treaties become less effective. It 
is also important to note that the EU is not against the right to use nuclear energy 
for peaceful purposes (see A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 9). This suggests that the norm is 
applicable to everyone under all circumstances and to all groups if the intent is the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
If we continue to the second category of the typology, the mode of enforcement 
of the norms, there are two countries which seems to be deviating from the norms 
of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. These countries are Iran and North 
Korea. Concerning Iran further sanctions are introduced which are more heavy 
punishments. The EU stated that:  
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“In adopting the sanctions resolution 1835 (2008) on the Iranian nuclear programme 
on the basis of Article 41 in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council 
again sent a firm message to Iran on the international community’s resolve. We deplore 
Iran’s persistent failure to comply with the requirements of the Security Council and the 
IAEA Board of Governors by refusing to suspend enrichment, to shed full light on its past 
and present activities and to grant IAEA the access and cooperation that it has demanded 
to resolve the outstanding questions mentioned in its reports, in order to restore confidence“ 
(A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 15) 
 
Concerning North Korea the EU was concerned about North Koreas restarting 
their nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. However, the EU only underlined that North 
Korea needed to comply with obligations and continue with the six-party talks 
(A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 15-16). Thus it seems to be a mix of punishment and reward. 
The severity however is heavy since earlier sanctions are still active.  
Syria is also discussed during this UNGA and the issue is the allegations that 
Syria had a non-declared nuclear reactor (see A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 16) but little is 
said if Syria should be rewarded if they start conforming to the norms or punished 
for allegedly deviating from the norms. This is also the case with countries whom 
have not signed and/or ratified the relevant treaties and resolutions.  
The enforcing agency which seems to be universal. Hints of this can be found 
during the 2nd (A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 14), 8th (A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 9) and 16th 
(A/C.1/63/PV.16, page 2) meetings. One good quote that illustrates this is from a 
statement during the 8th meeting where the EU stated that “We would recall, 
however, that the international community must at all costs prevent any redirection 
of civil nuclear programmes for the purposes of developing nuclear weapons.” 
(A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 9). This quote suggests that non-proliferation is a universal 
responsibility to ensure that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes.  
The extent of enforcement is a mix of lax/intermittent and rigorous/uniform. 
This becomes apparent when we compare the enforcement against Iran and North 
Korea and compare it with the enforcement on the rest of the countries. These two 
countries seem to be met with a uniform enforcement where the EU highlights the 
countries obligations and refer to resolutions from the UN Security Council. In 
contrast, other countries whom have not signed and/or ratified the relevant 
conventions, resolutions and treaties the extent of enforcement seem lax since they 
are only urged by the EU to conform to the norms. The EU also acknowledges that 
while the “existing machinery has produced significant obligations and 
commitments in the disarmament field. […] there are still problems relating to its 
functioning.” (A/C.1/63/PV.16) which suggests that the extent of enforcement is 
not functioning as it should be. 
The source of authority seems to be instrumental and rational, and the EU does 
not (directly) refer to any divine or inherent rights or obligations. The EU refer to 
international treaties like the NPT (A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 14 and A/C.1/63/PV.8, 
page 9), the CTBT (A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 16 and A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 10), the 
HCOC (A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 16 & 17, A/C.1/63/PV.11, page 7 & 8) and to relevant 
UN Security Council resolutions (see A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 11). 
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The degree of internalization is medium and some external reinforcement is 
needed. The earlier quote concerning sanctions shows that the IAEA is one external 
enforcement and during two points in time the EU talk about IAEA’s role where 
the EU “emphasizes the essential and unique role of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring compliance by States with their nuclear non-
proliferation undertakings” (A/C.1/63/PV.2, page 14). During the 8th meeting the 
EU also highlighted that the IAEA “must be the driving force behind these 
discussions.” (A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 10). At the same time the IAEA is seen as an 
institution that needs to be strengthen (see A/C.1/63/PV.8, page 9). At the same 
time, it seems that the majority of the UN member states conforms to the norms of 
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The EU does not argue that the 
developing of nuclear weapons is widely spread among the UN member states 
which suggests that some self-reinforcement is present.  
The last category of the typology is the conformity to the norms. The conformity 
to the norm seems to be attempted by the majority of the UN member states. There 
are countries whom evade the norms of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament 
but they do not actively deviate from it (at least the EU does not highlight this). The 
EU only highlights two countries which seem to deviate from the norms; Iran and 
North Korea. These countries are seen as a threat to international peace and the EU 
urges these countries to negotiate and conform to their obligations. Thus it suggests 
that these countries deviate greatly from the norms.  
5.3 The 64th UNGA 
The 64th UNGA was occurred between 2009 and 2010. The EU made statements 
during the 9th (13 October 2009), 12th (16 October 2009), 18th (23 October 2009), 
19th (27 October 2009) and 22nd (30 October 2009) meeting. All the statements were 
made by Ambassador Magnus Hellgren of the Swedish delegation and the 
statements were held in English. Two main norms could be identified; nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation. 
The first category of the typology discusses the distribution of the norms. The 
extent of acceptance seems to not be universal, which is made clear during the 9th, 
19th and 22nd meeting (see A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 11, A/C.1/64/PV.19, page 7 and 
A/C.1/64/PV.22, page 6) where the EU highlights the fact that not all countries have 
signed and/or ratified the relevant treaties and resolutions. This becomes especially 
clear during the 22nd meeting where the EU states that “The near-universality of the 
CTBT, although not yet in force, has resulted in the Treaty’s establishing a strong 
global norm against nuclear test explosions” (A/C.1/64/PV.22, page 6). During this 
meeting the EU especially urges “the nine States listed in annex 2 to the CTBT 
whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force.” (A/C.1/64/PV.22, page 6). 
The debate of the CTBT is an indication that the norms of non-proliferation and 
nuclear disarmament is not universal. 
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The extent of application is universal. The EU does not state any conditions or 
categories which are exempt from the norms of nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation. The statement made in the 22nd meeting gives us a clue of the extent 
of application of the norms. The EU underlines that the CTBT, while not yet in full 
force, has resulted in establishing “a strong global norm against nuclear test 
explosions” (A/C.1/64/PV.22, page 6). However, it is important to note that 
peaceful use of nuclear energy is allowed if this follows the NPT (see 
A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 11). 
If we continue to the second category, the mode of enforcement, it is somewhat 
hard to determine if reward of punishment is more present when the EU discusses 
the countries whom are evading the norms. Since these countries have not directly 
deviated from the norm they are not faced with direct punishment.  
In regards to North Korea and Iran it is clear that punishment is used rather than 
reward. The EU stated during the 19th meeting, in regards to Iran, that “in a spirit 
of mutual respect in order to find a negotiated solution that will address Iran’s 
interests as well as the international community’s concerns. The evolution of our 
relations with Iran will depend on that.” (A/C.1/64/PV.19, page 8). Thus the 
punishment is deteriorating relations with the international community. In the case 
of North Korea some hints of punishment can be found, especially during the 9th 
meeting where the EU condemns North Koreas latest activities and urges North 
Korea to conform to the international community’s demands (see A/C.1/64/PV.9, 
page 10-11). To be condemned in the UN is also a clear indication that the relations 
will deteriorate, something that suggests a form of punishment. We also have to 
remember that sanctions against Iran and North Korea are still active, which is a 
clear punishment. 
The severity of sanctions seems to be a mixture of light and heavy. In regards 
to Iran and North Korea sanctions are active, which are a heavy form of punishment. 
For instance during the 9th meeting the EU stated that “The EU once again urges 
Iran to comply fully with Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 
1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008).” (A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 7-8). 
Concerning the enforcing agency the EU stated that “In view of the new threats 
to security, the disarmament machinery has an increasingly important role to play. 
We should make every effort to preserve and, where possible, strengthen it.” 
(A/C.1/64/PV.18, page 1). At the same time the EU acknowledges that the 
disarmament needs improvement by stating that “The existing disarmament 
machinery has produced significant obligations and commitments in the 
disarmament field. While there is room for improvement, the machinery continues 
to have the potential to fulfil its functions.” (A/C.1/64/PV.18, page 2). This suggests 
that the extent of enforcement is not rigorous/uniform. This also becomes apparent 
with the countries who evade the norms by not signing and/or ratifying the relevant 
conventions since the EU does not highlight any punishment or actions against 
these. With the transgressor of the norms, Iran and North Korea, the degree of 
enforcement is somewhat uniform with UN Security Council resolutions being 
referred to.  
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The source of authority are rational and instrumental sources. The EU refers to 
the CTBT (see A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 10 and A/C.1/64/PV.22, page 6), the NPT (see 
A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 9, A/C.1/64/PV.19, page 7), the HCOC (see A/C.1/64/PV.12, 
page 8) and UN security Council resolutions (see A/C.1/64/PV.19, page 7-8) when 
discussing the UN member states’ rights and obligations. The EU does not refer to 
any absolute or inherent right or obligations. For instance, when discussing the NPT 
the EU stated that the treaty “remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-
proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament 
in accordance with its article VI, and an important element in the development of 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We must preserve and strengthen its authority 
and integrity“ (A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 9). 
The degree of internalization seems to be at a medium level and some external 
reinforcement is needed. The reason for why the degree of internalization is at 
medium is that the majority of the UN member states seem to conform to the norms 
and no external reinforcement is directly used (other than the EU trying to persuade 
the countries). At the same time some external reinforcement seems to be needed 
in regards to countries whom directly deviate from the norm. This is clear when the 
EU discusses Iran and North Korea. Here the EU calls for these countries to comply 
with the relevant international treaties and resolution, and to cooperate with the 
IAEA. 
One external reinforcement is the IAEA and during a statement during the 9th 
meeting the EU “emphasizes the essential role of the IAEA in monitoring States’ 
fulfilment of their nuclear non-proliferation undertakings“ (A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 
11). During the 9th meeting the EU argue for a strengthening the safeguards system 
in the IAEA (see A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 10). Another external reinforcement is the 
UN Security Council (see A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 9 and A/C.1/64/PV.12, page 7). 
The last category of the typology of norms is the conformity to the norms. It 
seems as if most of the member states try to conform to the norms relevant to non-
proliferation. Throughout the 64th UNGA it seems as if the majority of states 
conform to the norm, but the EU does not state how many countries who have not 
signed and/or ratified the relevant treaties.  
There are mainly two countries which the EU refer to when discussing deviants 
of the norm; Iran and North Korea (see A/C.1/64/PV.12, page 8 and 
(A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 10-11). For instance during the 9th meeting the EU “strongly 
condemned the test of a nuclear explosive device carried out by the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea on 25 May 2009” (A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 10-11) 
expresses its concerns by stating that “Such actions undermine the stability of the 
Korean peninsula and represent a threat to international peace and security.” 
(A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 10-11) and that North Korea needs to “return to compliance 
with the NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations” (A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 10-11). In 
regards to Iran the deviation seem to be failure to comply with the resolutions and 
failure to cooperate with IAEA but Iran does not seem to actively work against the 
norm (see A/C.1/64/PV.9, page 11).  
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Concerning the countries whom have not ratified the relevant treaties and 
resolutions the deviation is more of evasion than deviation. These countries are not 
accused by the EU of trying to acquire, develop or use nuclear weapons. Therefore 
they cannot be said to be deviating from the norm.  
5.4 The 65th UNGA 
The 65th UNGA spanned over 2010 and 2011. The EU made statements during the 
2nd (4 October 2010), 9th (13 October 2010), 12th (18 October 2010), 17th (22 
October 2010) and 19th (26 October 2010) meetings. All the statements were made 
by Ambassador Jean Lint of the delegation from Belgium and all the statements 
were held in French. During the 65th UNGA two main norms could be identified; 
nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. 
If we start with the first category of the typology of the norm (the distribution 
of the norms) it seems the norms of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are 
accepted by the majority of the UN member states. One sign of this is during a 
statement in the 9th meeting where the EU calls upon nine states listed in the annex 
2 of the CTBT to sign and ratify the treaty without any delay or reservations 
(A/65/C.1/PV.9, page 15). This suggests that the norms are not fully accepted by 
the UN member states. The extent of application of the norms are universal. No 
special condition or category of groups are specified by the EU during the whole 
UNGA. However, the EU are not against the peaceful use of nuclear energy (see 
A/65/C.1/PV.19, page 10).  
If we continue to the second category of the typology it is hard to determine if 
countries whom have not signed or ratified the relevant treaties and other relevant 
resolutions are either punished or rewarded since these countries are not deviating 
from the norms (they are merely evading the norms). In the case of Iran and North 
Korea it is clear that punishment is used more than reward. For instance during a 
statement in the 19th meeting the EU stated that Iran needed to respond “positively 
and without further delay to this offer of dialogue.” (A/65/C.1/PV.19, page 10). 
Therefore, the opposite of this would mean a punishment since this would destroy 
the “confidence of the international community in the exclusively peaceful nature 
of the Iranian nuclear programme” (A/65/C.1/PV.19, page 10). During this UNGA 
the sanctions from the 63rd UNGA is still active and new sanctions (Resolution 1929 
(2010)) are also introduced (see A/C.1/65/PV.19, page 10). It is clear that further 
severe punishment is put in place. This is similar to when the EU discussed North 
Korea in that North Korea needs to comply with the relevant resolutions in order to 
find a satisfactorily negotiated solution.  
The enforcing agency is a universal responsibility. For instance, during the 2nd 
meeting the EU stated that “The proliferation of missiles with the potential to 
deliver weapons of mass destruction remains a major concern for international 
security.” (A/65/C.1/PV.2, page 6). The quotes suggests that if proliferation of 
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nuclear weapons is a concern for international security and thus a responsibility for 
every UN member state. The EU does not state any specified responsibility for any 
certain actors or a condition where the norms are not enforceable.  
The extent of enforcement is a mix of lax/intermittent and rigorous/uniform. In 
regards to Iran and North Korea the extent of enforcement seems to be somewhat 
uniform since they are met with resolutions from the UN Security Council and are 
urged by the EU to follow their obligations. At the same time, the countries whom 
evade the norms seem to be met with a lax enforcement and are merely urged by 
the EU to conform to the norms. 
The source of authority are rational and instrumental. The EU mainly refers to 
the NPT (see A/65/C.1/PV.2, page 4, A/65/C.1/PV.9, page 14 and A/65/C.1/PV.19 
page 9), the CTBT (see A/65/C.1/PV.2, page 6, A/65/C.1/PV.9, page 15 and 
A/65/C.1/PV.19 page 10), The HCOC (see A/65/C.1/PV.17 page 15-16) and 
several resolutions (see A/65/C.1/PV.2, page 6 and A/65/C.1/PV.17 page 15). The 
EU does not seem to refer to any divine rights and/or obligations. Instead, the rights 
and obligations come from treaties.  
Throughout the meetings it becomes clear that the degree of internalization is 
at a medium level and that some external reinforcement is needed. There are some 
countries that evade and deviate from the norms but the majority seem to conform 
to the norms and do not need external reinforcement. One form of external 
reinforcement is the IAEA. Concerning the IAEA the EU stated that it “remains 
committed to ensuring responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, 
in the best safety, security and non-proliferation conditions” (A/65/C.1/PV.2, page 
6). Another external reinforcement is the UN Security Council of which the EU 
stated that it played a “crucial role that should be further strengthened in addressing 
cases of non-compliance threatening international peace and security“ 
(A/65/C.1/PV.2, page 5). In regards to CTBTO the EU stated its support for the 
organization (see A/65/C.1/PV.9, page 15). 
The last category is the conformity to the norms. Concerning the amount of 
conformity it seems that most UN member states attempt to conform to the norms. 
There are however some countries which seems to not fully conform to the norms. 
This becomes rather clear during a statement in the 9th meeting where the EU called 
“all States to respect the moratorium on experimental nuclear tests and to abstain 
from any act contrary to the obligations and provisions of the Treaty.” 
(A/65/C.1/PV.9, page 15). One good example of this is Syria whom seem to be 
evading and deviating from the norm. In this case the EU urges Syria to cooperate 
with the IAEA and ratify the CTBT (see A/65/C.1/PV.19, page 10).  
There are two countries whom deviate from the norms; Iran and North Korea. 
In regards to Iran and North Korea the EU stated during the 2nd meeting that:  
 
“We continue to face major proliferation challenges, which must be addressed 
resolutely in order to maintain the credibility of the NPT regime. Iran’s nuclear programme 
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s testing of a nuclear explosive device and 
delivery mechanisms are the two most worrying examples in this regard. Both issues raise 
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grave concerns and have led the EU, in particular in the case of Iran, to engage in sustained 
efforts to find a negotiated solution.” (A/65/C.1/PV.2, page 5) 
 
This quote shows us that Iran and North Korea deviate from the norms of non-
proliferation and disarmament in different ways. In the case of Iran the EU focuses 
on their nuclear program while in the case of North Korea the focus is on their 
testing of nuclear devices. This is a great deviation from the norms.  
5.5 The 66th UNGA 
The 66th UNGA was held between 2011 and 2012. The EU made no statements in 
the first committee during the 66th UNGA. The EU does not state any reason why 
the EU did not make any statements during the 66th UNGA, but according to an 
article in the Guardian the reason was due to disagreement on how the EU should 
make statements. The United Kingdom did not want the EU to start its statements 
‘on behalf of EU’. Instead the United Kingdom wanted to keep the past wording 
‘on behalf of the EU and its member states’. This disagreement made the United 
Kingdom block several statements during the 66th UNGA (Borger, 2011). 
5.6 The 67th UNGA 
The 67th UNGA spanned between 2012 and 2013. The EU made statements during 
the 2nd (8 October 2012), 9th (17 October 2012), 12th (22 October 2012) and 19th (5 
November 2012) meeting. Every statement, except for the statement during the 19th 
meeting, were held by Mr. Andras Kos who was the Minister Counsellor of the 
European Union during the 67th UNGA. The statement Mr. Kos did not make was 
held by Ms. Apeyitou from the delegation of Cyprus. Every statement was held in 
English. Two main norms can be identified; nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation. 
The first category of the typology is the distribution of the norms and 
concerning the extent of acceptance it seems that there is not a universal acceptance 
of the norms. For example the EU stated during the 2nd meeting that “The EU 
promotes universal adherence to, and the full implementation of, all non-
proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions” (A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 6). 
The EU does not specify how many have not signed and/or ratified the relevant 
treaties but it suggests that not all accept the norms.  
The extent of application seems to be applicable to everyone and to all 
conditions. The EU does not specify certain groups or conditions that would be 
exempted from the norms on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. For 
instance during the 9th meeting the EU stated that the:  
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“the application, reaffirmed by the 2010 NPT Review Conference, of the principles of 
irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to guide all measures in the field of nuclear 
disarmament and arms control as a contribution to establishing and upholding international 
peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account” (A/C.1/67/PV.9, page 
13) 
 
If we continue to the second category, the mode of enforcement, we can note 
that punishment is used more than reward during the debate.  In regards to North 
Korea and Iran the response seems somewhat uniform. The EU highlights the 
importance for both countries to cooperate with the IAEA (see (A/C.1/67/PV.2, 
page 7) and refers to the UN Security Council resolutions (see A/C.1/67/PV.9, page 
11). We also need to remember that sanctions against Iran and North Korea are still 
active. The case of Syria the response by the EU is that this is a matter for the 
Security Council to decide on (see A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 7). 
The enforcing agency is a universal responsibility. The EU highlights that “The 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery […] 
continues to be a major threat to international peace and security. It calls for a global 
approach, in addition to actions at the national and regional levels” (A/C.1/67/PV.2, 
page 6). During the 2nd meeting the EU also highlights that if the UN member states 
do not work together non-state actors could get hold of weapons of mass destruction 
(see A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 6) and damage the confidence and credibility of the 
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties (see A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 7). A global 
approach towards non-proliferation is according to the EU vital for international 
peace and security (see A/C.1/67/PV.12, page 9).  
The extent of enforcement seems to be a mix of lax/intermittent and 
rigorous/uniform depending on if the country deviates from the norms. In the case 
of the deviating countries the extent of enforcement seems to be uniform with the 
EU referring to the countries obligations to the adopted Security Council resolutions 
and relevant treaties. Concerning the countries that evade from the norms the extent 
of enforcement seems to be lax. The EU merely urges these to comply with the 
norms and does not specify any specific actions. 
Sources of authority is rational and instrumental. The sources are mainly the 
NPT (A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 7, A/C.1/67/PV.9, page 10 and A/C.1/67/PV.19, page 
3-4), the CTBT (A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 8), the HCOC (A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 9 and 
A/C.1/67/PV.12, page 12) and other relevant resolutions (see A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 
9). Any inherent or absolute sources of authority are not uttered by the EU during 
the meetings.  
The degree of internalization seems to be at a medium level. The majority of 
the UN member states seem to conform to the norms since the EU does not argue 
for any external reinforcement against these. However, Iran, North Korea and Syria 
seems to require external reinforcement through the IAEA (A/C.1/67/PV.9, page 
10-11 & 11-12), the UN Security Council (A/C.1/67/PV.9, page 12) and the 
CTBTO (A/C.1/67/PV.9, page 12). Therefore suggesting that some external 
reinforcement is needed. 
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The last category if the conformity to the norm and it seems that the majority of 
the UN member states attempt to conform to the norm (at least the EU does not 
state the opposite). At the same time there seems to be some countries that evade 
from the norm because the EU states several times that it works toward getting more 
states to sign and/or ratify the relevant treaties (see A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 7). 
Iran, North Korea and Syria are three countries that are deviating from the 
norms and are urged by the EU to comply with the IAEA (see A/C.1/67/PV.2, page 
7-8) and other obligations. The amount of deviance in the case of Iran and North 
Korea is great since they go directly against the norm of non-proliferation and 
nuclear disarmament. The language toward North Korea is strong during this 
UNGA. The EU strongly condemns the actions of North Korea and calls North 
Korea’s actions provocative (A/C.1/67/PV.9, page 11). In the case of Syria the 
focus seems to be on the chemical weapons due to the events of the Syrian civil war 
(see A/C.1/67/PV.12, page 10-11) and the EU calls for the UN Security Council to 
decide on the matter. 
5.7 Comparing the UNGAs 
The last step of the analysis is to determine if we can observe any changes in how 
the EU debates and refer to norms. During all the UNGAs two main norms can be 
identified; nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.  
Throughout the UNGAs the distribution of the norms remains relatively 
unchanged. The extent of acceptance and application is unchanged at the end of the 
studied time period with the exception of some new countries whom signed and/or 
ratified some of the relevant treaties. The EU does not state that there has been an 
increase in countries whom do not accept the norms or are no longer covered by the 
norms.  
The mode of enforcement also seems to be unchanged. The countries who have 
not signed or ratified the relevant treaties and resolutions are urged by the EU to do 
so, but they are not directly punished for evading the norms. The countries that 
deviate from the norms are, in contrast, punished. For instance, both Iran and North 
Korea are presented with sanctions and are urged by the EU to comply with their 
assigned obligations. The severity of the sanctions against the deviants can be 
considered to be heavy. 
The enforcing agency and the extent of enforcement are unchanged. The 
responsibility are universal since deviants of the norm are, according to the EU, a 
threat to international peace. The EU therefore argues for a global approach during 
every analysed UNGA. The extent of enforcement is a mix of lax/intermittent and 
rigorous/uniform depending on the situation where deviant countries are met with 
a more uniform enforcement in comparison to the evading countries. The sources 
of authority are unchanged with the EU referring to the obligations derived from 
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treaties and resolutions. No absolute, inherent or divine rights/obligations are 
(directly) uttered by the EU. 
The amount of conformity does not seem to have changed. Some additional 
countries have signed and ratified the most important treaties (like the NPT and the 
CTBT) but overall the majority of countries seem to conform to the norms. Iran and 
North Korea (and after later Syria) are the deviants from the norms and they seem 
to be deviating greatly. 
While no direct changes in how the EU debate and refer to norms can be 
observed the EU does have a representative during the 67th UNGA whom speak on 
behalf of the EU. Another important aspect which is important to note is that the 
EU did not make any statements during the 66th UNGA. This was due to a 
disagreement within the EU on how the EU should make statements in the UN. 
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6 Concluding discussion 
The purpose of this thesis was to answer the question how has the institutional 
changes in the treaty of Lisbon affected how the EU debates norms and what norms 
the EU refers to. My analysis shows that on the topic of nuclear weapons we cannot 
see any significant changes. The way the EU refers to and debate norms are 
unchanged during the whole analysed time period. 
What is the significance of the result? The results suggests that changes in 
formal institutions do not have a noticeable impact on how actors debate and refer 
to norms. Instead, other factors seem to be what determine if actors will change the 
way norms are debated and referred to. Thus, we should not expect to see many 
changes in the way the EU debate and refer to norms over time. 
The results presents us with some challenges for RCI and HI. According to RCI 
we should expect to see changes more or less in connection to the treaty, which is 
not the case. However, the idea of repeated games provides us with a possible 
explanation to the results. Since the actors within the EU have long negotiated for 
a common foreign policy it is hard for the EU to change its stance. The events 
during the 66th UNGA suggests that the institutional changes affected the perceived 
optimal outcome for the actors which made the EU’s disagreeing on the issue. 
HI offer us some helpful theoretical insights when analysing the significance of 
the results. Since the type of institutional change is a layering kind we know that 
the past institutions are still in use after the institutional changes. The path these 
institutions are on have therefore not changed and will most likely not change until 
the institution arrives at a critical juncture which will put the institutions on a new 
path. 
While the results suggests that changes in the formal institutions do not have an 
impact on how actors discuss and refer to norms it is still too early to conclude that 
the institutional changes prescribed in the treaty of Lisbon does not have any effect 
on this aspect. This study has only looked at one arena, one committee and one 
topic. It is therefore possible that I have missed some aspects due to constraints in 
the empirical data. What we can be quite sure of is that the idea that institutional 
change to formal institutions might not be the main reason to why actors change the 
way they debate and refer to norms in international politics. 
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